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The democratic control of military
power Europe1
Wolfgang Wagner
ABSTRACT The development of a ESDP has raised concerns over the EU’s iden-
tity as a ‘civilian power’. Whereas concerns over a gradual replacement of civilian
policy instruments by military force have been most prevalent, this article focuses
on a neglected dimension of the civilian power-concept, namely on the repercussions
of the ESDP for the democratic control of security and defence policy. It argues that
the Europeanization of defence politics leads to a democratic deficit because national
parliaments’ capacity to control executive decisions to use military force has been
weakened by the ESDP and neither the European Parliament nor the former
WEU assembly has been able to compensate for this loss of parliamentary control.
This democratic deficit may not only damage the legitimacy of EU-led military mis-
sions but may also compromise the EU’s ability to lead by virtuous example.
KEY WORDS Civil–military relations; democracy; democratic peace; European
Parliament; European Security and Defence Policy; WEU.
INTRODUCTION
Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has been an active player in military
crisis management: the EU has led military missions in Bosnia, Macedonia
and the Bunia region in Northern Congo with up to some 7,000 troops in
Bosnia and 2,000 in Bunia. The development of a European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) has raised concerns over the EU’s identity as a ‘civilian
power’. Most prevalent, of course, have been concerns over a gradual replace-
ment of civilian policy instruments (such as aid, diplomacy, or sanctions) by
military force (cf., for example, Smith 2000). Less attention has been paid to
the repercussions of the ESDP for civil–military relations and the democratic
control of security and defence policy.
To be sure, civilian control of the ESDP has never been challenged. In con-
trast, civil–military relations in the EU have followed the democratic role
model:2 the newly established Military Committee (MC, composed of chiefs
of defence, represented by military representatives) and Military Staff (MS,
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composed of seconded experts from the member states) are clearly subordinate
to the Political and Security Committe (PSC, consisting of senior diplomats at
ambassador level) and the foreign ministers in the General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC). The defence ministers have not even been granted
a Council configuration of their own. Instead, they have only been able to meet
at the fringes of the GAERC.
However, a new generation of scholars working on civil–military relations in
democracies have been less concerned with ‘the threat of praetorian military
intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need to enforce civilian
executive control of the military’ (Cottey et al. 2002: 31). Instead they plead
for a reconceptualization ‘in terms of democratic governance of the defense
and security sector’ (Cottey et al. 2002: 32) and for particular attention to be
paid ‘to the role of parliaments in providing oversight of the armed forces,
defense policy, and the executive’s control of the military and the wider civil
society debate on armed forces and defense’ (Cottey et al. 2002: 39).
This article argues that the ESDP, though not challenging civilian control of
the military, does warrant concerns about the democratic control of defence
policy in Europe. The lack of attention to this problematique is surprising for
at least three reasons: first, the democratic control of foreign, security and
defence policy has frequently been regarded as a defining moment of a civilian
power (cf., for example, Stavridis 2001 and Smith 2004). This is closely related
to a second reason, namely that democracy has been celebrated as a cause for
peace in large parts of the peace research community. According to the
‘democratic peace’, ‘the participatory nature of the states’ political institutions
constrains leaders because the populations who must bear the costs of war may
be unwilling to do so if the costs are high or the policy fails’ (Siverson 1995:
482; cf. also Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Thus, the literature on
the democratic peace provides the theoretical foundation of why the democratic
control of security and defence policy is indeed an important feature of a civilian
power. Third, the deficiencies of the EU as a democracy have been subject to a
lively debate but this debate has focused almost exclusively on issues of the first
pillar of the EU (for an excellent overview of that debate cf. Hix 2005: ch. 6).
This article focuses on the implications of the ESDP for the democratic
control of security and defence policy. It argues that the Europeanization of
defence politics leads to a democratic deficit. Because the democratic control
of security and defence policy can be considered an essential element of a civilian
power, this aggravates concerns about the future of the ‘civilian power Europe’.
Space constraints do not allow a comprehensive discussion of the manifold
aspects of democratic control of security and defence politics (for a more com-
prehensive discussion of the democratic legitimacy of the ESDP, cf. Wagner
2005). The second section argues, however, that the parliamentary control of
deployment decisions is a key aspect of democratic control and may therefore
serve as a proxy for the problem at large. The third section then demonstrates
that national parliaments’ capacity to control executive decisions to use military
force has been weakened by the ESDP. The fourth section sketches problems
W. Wagner: Democratic control of military power Europe 201
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and options of parliamentary control at the European level. It discusses the com-
petencies of the European Parliament and the ‘Interim European Security and
Defence Assembly’ as well as further options to strengthen transnational parlia-
mentary control. Finally, the concluding section presents an assessment of the
damage done to the EU as a civilian power by the emerging democratic deficit.
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS
Security and defence politics impacts on citizens’ lives in many ways: recruit-
ment policy determines how much (if any) time young men must spend as con-
scripts, and the defence budget influences how much the government can
dedicate to social policy, etc. The most tremendous impact, however, results
from decisions on the actual deployment of troops in military missions
because, in addition to their political and fiscal repercussions, citizens’ lives are
then put at risk. Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of deployment
decisions has grown because ‘peace support operations’ have become more
common as a number of violent conflicts have increased the demand for such mis-
sions. At the same time, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has been
blocked less frequently by one of the veto powers. In 2003, the then fifteen
member states of the EU had deployed some 55,000 troops in international
peace support operations (Giegerich and Wallace 2004: 169). From the perspec-
tive of democratic control, deployment decisions can therefore be regarded as the
most important aspect of contemporary security and defence policy.
In the literature on the democratic peace, regular free elections are considered
the most important mechanism to hold executives accountable. According to
Morgan and Campbell, ‘leaders who have to stand for popular election should
be expected to take public attitudes into account when making decisions’
(1991: 190). Democracies are considered to be less war-prone because ‘leaders
of democratic states typically experience high political costs from fighting
wars – always from losing them, and often despite winning them’ (Russett
and Oneal 2001: 54). In addition to free elections, Morgan and Campbell
have identified the ‘nature of political competition’ and ‘the degree to which
the leader must share decision-making power’ as further mechanisms to con-
strain political leaders. These latter mechanisms are of particular importance
where deployments below the threshold of war are concerned because they are
less likely to have an impact on citizens’ electoral decisions (especially if they
are carried out early in the election cycle). In such cases, ‘parliaments are the
central locus of accountability for any governmental decision-making concern-
ing the use of force’ (Ha¨nggi 2004: 11; cf. also Morgan and Campbell 1991:
191). As elected representatives of the people, the articulation of popular inter-
ests and concerns has been a prominent task of members of parliament.
Hans Born and Heiner Ha¨nggi have distinguished three dimensions of par-
liamentary power in security and defence politics: ‘authority’ refers to ‘the power
which Parliament uses to hold government accountable’ and which is ‘derived
from the constitutional and legal framework as well as customary practices’.
202 Journal of European Public Policy
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‘Ability’ denotes the resources such as specialized committees, budget and staff
which are necessary to make efficient use of the authority conferred upon parlia-
ment. Finally, ‘attitude’ refers to the ‘willingness to hold the executive to
account’ which, among other things, depends on the extent to which
legislative–executive relations are characterized by party discipline (all quotes
from Born 2004: 209–11). Although each of these factors has had an influence
on the effectiveness of parliamentary accountability, Born and Ha¨nggi conclude
that ‘the strongest means of parliamentary oversight by far is . . . the consti-
tutional or legal right to approve or reject such use of force’ (Ha¨nggi 2004:
14). In contrast, budget and staff are certainly indispensable to make use of
legal authority but they reflect rather than cause legal powers.
Therefore, in discussing the democratic control of security and defence
policy, this article focuses on parliament’s control of deployment decisions.
THE ESDP AND THE WEAKENING OF NATIONAL DEMOCRACY
This section argues that the ESDP tends to undermine parliamentary control of
deployment decisions at the national level. The general claim that a democratic
deficit results from a Europeanization of policy-making has of course been well
established. However, this claim has been almost exclusively substantiated with
case studies from the EU’s first pillar where member state governments may
even be outvoted in Council under qualified majority voting. The first part of
this section demonstrates that the integration of military structures in particular
brings about a similar effect. The second part then adds an important caveat,
namely that this tendency to undermine parliamentary control is very uneven
across the member states because member countries differ vastly as regards
their parliaments’ competencies in security and defence policy. In the third
part of this section, Germany’s decision to participate in the military enforce-
ment of the no-fly zone over Bosnia in 1993 serves as an illustration.
The difficult parliamentary control of deploying integrated
military structures
Particularly since the Danish voters’ rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,
scholars of EU politics have been concerned with a democratic deficit in Euro-
pean politics. Andrew Moravcsik and Klaus Dieter Wolf in particular have
pointed to this ‘dark side of intergovernmental cooperation’ (Wolf 1999:
334), i.e. that ‘international cooperation tends to redistribute domestic political
resources toward executives’ (Moravcsik 1994: 7). According to Moravcsik, a
loss of control over the executive results from four causal mechanisms: first,
international co-operation enhances the executive’s control over the domestic
agenda because the international agenda has been ‘cartelized’ between national
leaders. Second, once international agreement has been reached, it ‘may be
costly, sometimes prohibitively so, for national parliaments, publics or officials
to reject, amend or block ratification of and compliance with decisions reached
W. Wagner: Democratic control of military power Europe 203
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by national executives in international fora’ (Moravcsik 1994: 11). Third, inter-
national co-operation gives executives privileged access to information about the
political constraints of other governments and about the technical consequences
of alternative policies. Finally, executives can impose an initial ideological
‘frame’ on an issue which is difficult for domestic groups to challenge.
This general trend of privileging the executive in the process of Europeaniza-
tion is exacerbated in security and defence policy by the integration of military
forces on an international level.3 If forces have been integrated, any state’s
decision against its participation in a mission de facto frustrates the entire
deployment because other states’ forces cannot work effectively without the
missing state’s contribution. As a consequence, states whose forces have been
integrated on an international level may come under heavy peer pressure
from those states that advocate the use of joint forces.
Since the end of the Cold War, EU member states have faced strong incen-
tives to integrate their military forces. First of all, shrinking defence budgets in
all member states have made their efficient spending more pressing. Member
states have therefore been more prepared to participate in joint armaments pro-
jects and to engage in role specialization in order to obtain more value for money
(Schmitt 2003). Furthermore, the integration of military forces has been pro-
moted for political reasons. With the common threat to Western European
security disappearing, experts and decision-makers across Europe have been
concerned about a renationalization of security and defence policies. The inte-
gration of military structures has been a powerful instrument to give credibility
to the commitment to prevent a renationalization of defence policies.
An uneven democratic deficit
The degree to which a Europeanization of security and defence policy under-
mines parliamentary control at the national level not only depends on the
degree to which military forces have been integrated but also on the level of par-
liamentary control over security and defence policy in the first place. Among the
EU member states, there have been huge differences as regards parliaments’
competencies in security and defence policy.4 In former colonial powers, for
example, governments are usually allowed to deploy troops without the
consent of parliament (Born and Urscheler 2004: 64f.). Thus, the governments
in France and the United Kingdom decided to participate in North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes against Serbian targets in 1999
without having consulted parliament. In a similar vein, no parliamentary
approval is required in Spain, Belgium and Greece.
In contrast, the consent of parliament prior to any deployment of troops has
been required in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and many of
the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, even
two-thirds of the Members of Parliament must vote in favour of a deployment.
In Italy and the Netherlands, governments have regarded parliamentary
approval as indispensable although there has been no constitutional requirement
204 Journal of European Public Policy
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to do so. However, in some of these countries, the deployment law provides for
exceptions from and modifications of the general rule of parliamentary
approval. In Austria, parliament has delegated its right to approve or disapprove
of military deployments to a standing committee (‘Hauptausschuss’) which
has participated in the exercise of various executive tasks. Moreover, the govern-
ment may deploy troops without parliamentary approval if urgency does not
allow for it. In this case, a debate must be held within fifteen days. In case
parliament does not endorse the deployment, the respective troops have to be
ordered back.
Yet another exemption from general parliamentary approval can be found
in Sweden: here, the government may deploy troops without consulting
parliament if the deployment takes place within the framework of multilateral
security institutions. In particular, deployments based on a ‘standby agree-
ment’ as provided by article 43 of the UN Charter do not require the
consent of the Riksdag. Similarly, deployments based on international agree-
ments that have been endorsed by parliament are exempted from further
approval. In Ireland, there has been still another exemption from general par-
liamentary approval for deployments consisting of less than twelve armed
soldiers.
This brief survey of deployment law underlines the differences among EU
member states with regard to parliament’s role in security and defence policy.
As a consequence, the ‘dark side of international co-operation’ can be felt in
the EU member states to very different degrees.
Parliamentary accountability versus alliance solidarity: the case of
Germany
As the EU has only begun to assume a role in peace support operations, it has
not yet experienced severe conflicts between the demands of military inte-
gration, on the one hand, and parliamentary control, on the other hand. In
this section, therefore, the case of Germany in NATO will serve as an illus-
tration. Of course, NATO differs from the EU in many respects, most impor-
tantly as regards the dominant role of the US which retains a fully-fledged
unilateral military capability. At the same time, however, NATO and the EU
resemble each other in one important respect of relevance here, i.e. in having
developed a strong sense of common identity and solidarity. As a consequence,
NATO as well as EU members tend to include their fellow members’ concerns
in their definition of security interests (Risse-Kappen 1995; Risse 2001; Sjursen
2004). Moreover, the case of NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) fleet comes very close to what the EU envisions in terms of military
integration and role specialization. Thus, conflicts very similar to that experi-
enced by Germany in NATO are likely to arise in the EU, especially if it realizes
the ‘Headline Goal 2010’ which provides for the creation of multinational, inte-
grated ‘battle groups’.
W. Wagner: Democratic control of military power Europe 205
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Germany is particularly suited to illustrate the conflicting demands of mili-
tary integration and parliamentary control. As a consequence of two world wars
and the atrocities of the Wehrmacht, Germany has been a champion of both
multilateralism and antimilitarism (among many others, see Anderson and
Goodman 1993; Berger 1998). Since the fierce debate over rearmament in
the 1950s, a reluctance to use military force and a commitment to multilateral-
ism became prime pillars of post-war German security policy. However, since
the end of the Cold War and the growing number of peace support operations
out of area, tensions between these two principles have mounted.
Right after the Cold War, a participation of the Bundeswehr in out of area
missions was widely opposed in Germany. Indeed, the German government
refrained from sending the Bundeswehr to the Persian Gulf in 1990–91. At
the time of the Gulf crisis of 1990–91, German politicians were eager to
demonstrate the country’s peacefulness and were ‘surprised that the USA and
Israel, among others, condemned Germany for not contributing militarily
against Iraq’ (Philippi 2001: 51). German decision-makers had to realize that
its NATO partners now expected Germany as an ally to make a substantial con-
tribution to non-article 5 operations (Baumann 2001: 166). Moreover, they rea-
lized that ‘similar behaviour in a future conflict would probably result in a crisis
with its major allies’ (Philippi 2001: 51). From then on, German governments
aimed at overcoming the antimilitarist culture as an obstacle to the deployment
of the Bundeswehr out of area. For this purpose, ‘reliability as an ally’ and
‘alliance solidarity’ became prominent arguments in the German debate over
out of area missions (cf. Schwab-Trapp 2002). These arguments were buttressed
by references to integrated force structures of which the Bundeswehr had been
part. References to Germany’s participation in NATO’s AWACS illustrate this
point: AWACS has been designed to recognize enemy aircraft over a given
territory, most importantly in the event of an attack (defensive function). In
addition, it may help to identify and select targets for air strikes (offensive
function). In 1993, NATO offered its AWACS fleet to enforce the no-fly
zone over Bosnia which the UN Security Council had agreed on. The
German government’s decision not to withdraw Bundeswehr personnel from
AWACS met considerable criticism from the opposition and even from
within the governing coalition. Thus, in early 1993, the Federal Constitutional
Court (FCC) had to give a preliminary ruling on whether the participation of
the Bundeswehr violated the German constitution as the opposition argued.5
With a narrow margin of 5:3 votes, the FCC endorsed the government’s
decision to have the Bundeswehr participate in AWACS’s mission over
Bosnia. Concerns about alliance solidarity and reliability played a decisive
role in the judgment. The Court noted that the Bundeswehr made up for
around 30 per cent of AWACS’s personnel. As a consequence, a withdrawal
of German soldiers at the very moment of this mission would endanger the
enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Furthermore, ‘allies and European
neighbours would inevitably lose trust in German policy; the resulting damage
would be irreparable.’6 Thus, the fact that the Bundeswehr participated in an
206 Journal of European Public Policy
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integrated military structure played a decisive role in legitimizing Germany’s
first combat (in contrast to humanitarian or peace-keeping) mission out of
area. Since then, the scope of Germany’s contribution to out of area missions
has grown continually (cf. for an overview Baumann and Hellmann 2001).
In the main judgment of July 1994, the FCC affirmed the principle that any
deployment of the Bundeswehr must obtain parliamentary approval in advance.
According to the FCC, the use of the armed forces is not within the executive’s
sole discretion but as a ‘parliamentary army’ part of the democratic consti-
tutional order. However, the principle of advance parliamentary approval is cir-
cumscribed in two cases: ‘The participation of the Bundestag in a specific
decision to deploy troops that constitutional law requires must not compromise
Germany’s ability to defend itself (Wehrfa¨higkeit) and to make alliance commit-
ments (Bu¨ndnisfa¨higkeit)’ (author’s translation).
Since the FCC’s ruling, the Bundestag has dealt with more than thirty
deployments of the Bundeswehr (including the prolongation and extension of
missions) (Meyer 2004: 19–20). However, this practice has again come
under pressure since NATO’s Prague summit decided to set up a multinational
‘Response Force’ that could be deployed for the most demanding peace support
missions within a few days. The deployment of the NATO Response Force
(NRF) was simulated at an informal NATO summit in Colorado Springs in
October 2003. It soon became clear that a rapid deployment could be endan-
gered by the required advance approval of the German parliament. As with
AWACS, German troops would play an essential role in the NRF. In contrast
to AWACS, however, even a belated ‘green light’ would possibly cause pro-
blems. As a consequence, German Defence Minister Struck immediately
launched a debate about a reform of Germany’s parliamentary proviso.
Struck’s suggestion was supported by his American colleague, Donald
Rumsfeld, who urged NATO members ‘to bring NATO’s decision-making
structures up to date so that NATO military commanders can take decisive
action against fast-moving threats in the 21st century’.7
To be sure, the conflict between the democratic control of the armed forces
and the demands of alliance politics is nowhere likely to be as intense as in
Germany where both demanding standards of parliamentary control and mul-
tinational integration were designed to prevent a resurgence of militarism.
However, similar though possibly less intense conflicts are likely to occur in
other states with traditionally high levels of parliamentary control as well.
Moreover, the EU might become the prime forum for such conflicts to the
extent that the ESDP steps into NATO’s footprints. In particular, the
project of EU ‘battle groups’, i.e. small, integrated multinational forces to
be deployed at short notice, is likely to result in conflicts very similar to
those over the NRF. Moreover, the EU comprises a couple of member
states that remained aloof from military alliances during the Cold War. As
the brief survey of member states’ standards above demonstrated, many of
these states (e.g. Austria, Ireland and Sweden) have had high standards of
parliamentary control similar to those in Germany.
W. Wagner: Democratic control of military power Europe 207
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PROSPECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL AT THE
EUROPEAN LEVEL
The emerging democratic deficit at the national level has led to calls to compen-
sate for the weakening of national parliaments with a strengthening of supra-
national or transnational parliamentary institutions. This section therefore
explores the prospects of redressing the democratic deficit at the European
level. It begins with a discussion of the competencies of the European Parlia-
ment (EP), then proceeds to analyse the merits of the ‘Interim European Secur-
ity and Defence Assembly’, and finally presents some further options for
transnational parliamentary collaboration.
The limited powers of the European Parliament
The member states have only hesitantly endowed the EP with competencies in
foreign, security and defence policy. In fact, the establishment of European Pol-
itical Cooperation outside the Treaty Establishing the European Community
and the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a distinct
pillar of the EU was primarily driven by a desire to keep the supranational insti-
tutions’ competencies limited.
While the EP has established itself as an actor in foreign and security policy,
the ESDP has remained aloof from the EP’s involvement. Article 21 of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) which obliges the Presidency to consult
the EP ‘on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign
and security policy’ and to ‘ensure that the views of the European Parliament
are duly taken into consideration’ does not even mention the ESDP explicitly.
However, this wording has not prevented the Presidency and the Council from
extending consultations informally to the realm of the ESDP (Mammonas
2003: 5; Gourlay 2004: 188f.). One member of the EP’s foreign affairs commit-
tee even observed that the High Representative, Solana, and the Commissioner
for External Affairs, Chris Patten, discussed external affairs with the committee
more frequently than their national counterparts with national parliaments. As
these habits underline, the scope of article 21 should be extended to security and
defence policy. Indeed, the constitutional treaty suggests a respective rewording.
According to article I-40 (8), ‘The European Parliament shall be regularly con-
sulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common security and
defence policy. It shall be kept informed of how it evolves.’
Over the last couple of years, the EP has begun to redress the lack of resources
devoted to the ESDP (cf. Brok and Gresch 2004). Whereas its foreign affairs
committee devoted a considerable part of its resources to the enlargement
process during the fifth parliamentary term (1999–2004), the current commit-
tee has established a subcommittee on security and defence which is a clear indi-
cator of future priorities. Since 2002, an interinstitutional agreement gives the
Council the possibility of sharing classified documents with a small committee
of the EP. As Catriona Gourlay has pointed out, this ‘agreement does not,
208 Journal of European Public Policy
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however, confer rights on the parliament to receive access to classified infor-
mation but rather gives the Council the right to share classified information
where it is appropriate and possible in the light of the nature and the content
of the information’ (Gourlay 2004: 190). Furthermore, the EP has endeavoured
to cultivate good relations with NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly (PA). Since
2001, the EP has sent a delegation to the PA’s sessions. Moreover, there have
been joint sessions of EP and PA committees. In doing so, the EP has demon-
strated its ability to foster relations with those NATO countries that are not
members of the EU. Drawing on the three factors determining the effectiveness
of parliamentary oversight, one can conclude that the EP has now begun to
enhance its ability to use its legal powers. Notwithstanding these improvements,
however, the EP’s overall powers in security and defence policy are still rather
limited. Most importantly, the member state governments have no obligation
to even consult the EP before deciding on the deployment of troops. As
regards this crucial aspect of defence politics, the EP can therefore hardly com-
pensate for the weakening of parliamentary control at the national level.
The ‘Interim European Security and Defence Assembly’
The transfer of operational tasks from the Western European Union (WEU) to
the EU has led to the odd situation that a further supra- or rather transnational
parliament has been involved in European Security and Defence Policy: the
WEU’s Parliamentary Assembly. Because the WEU’s mutual defence commit-
ment exceeds that of NATO, members of the WEU preferred not to dissolve the
WEU but only to transfer its operational tasks to the EU. The decision not to
dissolve the WEU Treaty also implied that its article IX, according to which the
Council of the WEU submits an annual report to the WEU Parliamentary
Assembly, remained valid. At the time, some urged the Parliamentary Assembly
to dissolve itself. Instead, the parliamentarians, who are not elected directly but
nominated from national parliaments, decided to rename it the ‘Interim Euro-
pean Security and Defence Assembly’ and to continue their work.
The ‘Interim European Security and Defence Assembly’ may even claim
several comparative advantages over the EP in scrutinizing the ESDP: First,
the interim assembly’s composition of national deputies fits the ESDP’s inter-
governmental structure well. After all, national governments will retain prime
responsibility for the foreseeable future. Thus, it appears appropriate to delegate
democratic control of the ESDP to national parliamentarians in a transnational
institution. Second, the interim assembly assembles deputies from twenty-eight
members of the ‘WEU family’ (as the assembly’s homepage puts it). In addition
to twenty-three EU members (i.e. all EU states except Malta and Cyprus), this
includes Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iceland and Norway which are members
of NATO but not of the EU and whose appropriate involvement in the
ESDP has been heavily contested (cf. Missiroli 2002). Thus, the interim assem-
bly could contribute to good relations between the EU and European NATO
members on a parliamentary level.
W. Wagner: Democratic control of military power Europe 209
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These advantages of giving the interim assembly a prominent role in the
democratic control of the ESDP are balanced by several disadvantages. Firstly,
the members of national parliaments currently participating in the WEU/
interim assembly do not always belong to the defence and foreign affairs commit-
tees in their respective parliaments, since they usually also participate in the
Council of Europe Assembly. However, most importantly, a second chamber
for the democratic control of the ESDP adds further complexity to the insti-
tutional system of the EU. Such an increase in complexity would conflict with
transparent and clear-cut lines of accountability which are a prerequisite of demo-
cratic legitimacy. Moreover, an institutional separation of the ESDP and other
issues of external relations seems artificial and difficult to maintain. At a time
when the EU’s ‘double executive’ in external affairs begins to merge in order to
increase policy coherence, as suggested in the draft Constitutional Treaty, it
seems odd to create a ‘double legislative’ to supervise external policies. What is
more, turf battles between the EP and the interim assembly are inevitable.
As a result, the interim assembly has been more and more marginalized in
European security and defence politics and is likely to suffer from a further
loss of attention when the EP dedicates more resources to the ESDP. As a con-
sequence, the interim assembly’s capacities to compensate the emerging demo-
cratic deficit on a national level have been very limited and are likely to decline
even further.
Options for transparliamentary control of the ESDP
As the previous paragraphs made clear, neither the EP nor the interim assembly
has been granted sufficient competencies to compensate for the democratic
deficit that the Europeanization of defence politics has brought about at the
national level. Since the EP has reinforced its ability to monitor the ESDP at
a supranational level, the main challenge ahead lies in improving the trans-
national scrutiny of the ESDP, particularly as the interim assembly has been
increasingly marginalized.
Ultimately, it is the national parliaments themselves which have to decide
how to organize an exchange of information and points of views. After all,
the success of inter-parliamentary co-operation depends first of all on delegates’
efforts and commitment. Four options can be suggested for discussion.
First, of course, a new institution could be established. The latest proposal in
this vein was submitted to the ‘Constitutional Convention’. Its President, Vale´ry
Giscard d’Estaing, proposed a ‘Congress of European Peoples’, composed of
members of the European and the national parliaments, that would meet on
a regular, possibly annual, basis. However, the proposal was suspected of inten-
tionally weakening the EP. Mainly for this reason, it did not find a majority
among the delegates in the convention and was dropped from the final
version of the Treaty for a European Constitution.
Second, inter-parliamentary co-operation in security and defence policy
could be organized by the EP (Gourlay and Tappert 2004). Such an endeavour
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could build upon inter-parliamentary co-operation on issues of the European
Community’s first pillar (for an overview cf. Maurer 2003). Here, joint sessions
of EP committees with their national counterparts have served to exchange
information and views. Moreover, joint committee sessions have given
members of national parliaments the opportunity to address EU officials
directly. So far, this instrument has hardly been used in foreign, security and
defence policy. However, the new subcommittee on security and defence may
choose to make inter-parliamentary co-operation a priority of its work.
Third, the ‘Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of
Parliaments of the European Union’ (COSAC) could make security and defence
policy a new focus of its work. What makes the COSAC an interesting institution
to build on is that it has not been a creation of the member state governments but
an example of parliamentary self-organization resulting from an initiative of the
then President of the French Assemble´ National, Fabius. Thus, it has been a suc-
cessful and visible expression of national parliaments’ desire and capacity to
strengthen inter-parliamentary co-operation. Since 1989, national European
affairs committees as well as the EP each delegate six deputies to the COSAC
meetings which take place twice a year before the meeting of the European
Council. The COSAC has so far focused almost exclusively on institutional ques-
tions. In contrast, issues of security and defence have played only a marginal role
(Mittag 2003: 97). The COSAC’s focus would be easy to change, however,
exactly because it has been an exercise in parliamentary self-organization and
does not depend on intergovernmental conferences to change its statute. In
order to give security and defence policy a more prominent role, the COSAC
would have to give members of national parliaments’ foreign affairs and
defence committees access to the COSAC. This, of course, requires the
members of the European affairs committees to share some of their powers.
Moreover, member parliaments’ delegations should become more representative
of the party pluralism in national parliaments (Hilger 2002). It remains to be seen
whether this turns out to be a significant obstacle to making the COSAC the
centre of multi-level parliamentary control in security and defence policy.
Finally, efforts to organize inter-parliamentary co-operation in security and
defence could of course build upon the interim assembly whose merits have
been discussed above. As mentioned above, however, the EP tends to regard
the interim assembly more as a competitor than a collaborator. The interim
assembly could, however, seek stronger ties with the COSAC. For example,
the interim assembly could aim at becoming some kind of COSAC security
and defence chamber.
Taken together, the responsibility for democratic legitimacy should not be
left to national parliaments alone. Because the Europeanization of security
and defence policy tends to weaken national parliaments vis-a`-vis their execu-
tives, a multi-level system of parliamentary control seems most appropriate.
In addition to national parliaments’ tasks, such a system would include a
strong EP and some form of inter-parliamentary co-operation comprising
both the European and the national parliaments. As regards the EP, the
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constitutional treaty would contribute to an enhanced supranational input
legitimacy. Although the EP would not acquire competencies akin to those in
common market legislation, its competencies in foreign policy would be expli-
citly extended to security and defence policy. As regards inter-parliamentary co-
operation, several institutional venues appear possible, and it is up to the
members of national parliaments in particular to organize co-operation.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of parliamentary control of deployment decisions has pointed to a
democratic deficit in the EU’s security and defence policy. To be sure, other
dimensions of democracy may suffer less and some (e.g. transparency and open-
ness of decision-making) may even gain from a Europeanization of security and
defence politics. In terms of the dimension of parliamentary control on which
this paper has focused, however, a democratic deficit has emerged.
At first glance, this should not come as a surprise as EU politics has become
familiar with the notion of a democratic deficit ever since European integration
went beyond the establishment of a free trade area. However, it seems worth-
while noting some differences between the democratic deficit in the first pillar
and the one in the ESDP: first, the extent of the democratic deficit depends
on the traditional level of parliamentary control of security and defence politics
in the member states. As a consequence, the democratic deficit differs widely
across the member states. Second, the impact of security and defence policy
may, of course, be much more noticeable than many domestic issue areas.
After all, security and defence policy does imply the possibility of sending citi-
zens to a battlefield. As a consequence, a severe policy failure (such as high
casualties in a EU-led military mission) may not only damage support for
and legitimacy of the ESDP but of the EU as a whole (see below).
From the normative viewpoint which has inspired much of the civilian power
literature, the democratic deficit in the ESDP must appear alarming as the
democratic control of security and defence policy has frequently been
counted among the defining features of a civilian power. More specifically,
the democratic deficit in security and defence politics may damage the EU as
a civilian (and civilizing) power in several ways: first, following the core claim
of democratic peace research, a mounting democratic deficit in EU security
and defence policy may ease the use of force since institutional constraints
have been weakened.8 As the example of Germany has illustrated above, opposi-
tion against the use of force is easier to overcome for executives if security and
defence politics have been internationalized.
Second, the democratic deficit in the ESDP may damage the legitimacy of
EU-led military missions. If input legitimacy for the deployment of armed
forces via parliamentary debate and approval has been weakened, a mission’s
legitimacy becomes largely dependent on its output. As a consequence, any
failure (e.g. high casualties) may severely damage support for the EU’s
defence policy or even the EU in general.
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Third, the ability of the EU to lead by virtuous example – a central feature of
the EU’s normative power (Manners 2002: 244) – may be compromised. If the
EU continues to regard the spread of democracy (and, by extension, the demo-
cratic control of security and defence policy) as an instrument to promote peace,
its own democratic deficit would render it vulnerable.
Given these negative consequences of the ESDP for the EU as a civilian
power, the EU should make more efforts to improve parliamentary control of
the ESDP at the supranational and transnational level.
Biographical note: Wolfgang Wagner is a Research Fellow at the Peace Research
Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany.
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NOTES
1 I have benefited from discussions at the CIDEL workshop in Oslo in October 2004,
at the EUSA conference in Austin in March 2005, and at a seminar at the University
of Oslo in April 2005. In particular I would like to thank Helene Sjursen, Michael
Bothe, Erik O. Eriksen, Carlos Closa, Matthias Dembinski, Anna Geis and Knud
Erik Jørgensen.
2 On civil–military relations cf. the classical work by Huntington (1957) as well as
Feaver (2003).
3 Respective concerns have been voiced, among others, by Hummel (2003) and by
Bono (2004). Matthias Koenig-Archibugi has even argued that the disentanglement
from parliamentary control has been an important driving force for EU govern-
ments to advocate a Europeanization of foreign, security and defence policy (cf.
Koenig-Archibugi 2004).
4 A good overview has been given in the Assembly of the Western European Union,
the Interim European Security and Defence Assembly, National Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Intervention Abroad by Armed Forces Engaged in International
Missions: The Current Position in Law (Doc. A/1762), Paris, 2001. This report
treats all then EU members except for Ireland and Austria. Parliamentary competen-
cies in Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Poland are
further treated in Mittag (2003). See also Siedschlag (2002).
5 After a previous preliminary ruling on German participation in monitoring a
maritime embargo against Yugoslavia and a further preliminary ruling on the
Bundeswehr’s participation in the United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM) II, the main ruling was made in July 1994 (BverfG E [decisions of
the Federal Constitutional Court] vol. 90, 286, II, pp. 286–394). However, we
will focus on the preliminary ‘AWACS’ ruling because it was part of the
decision-making process on Germany’s first combat mission.
6 BverfG E vol. 88, 173, II, p.183, author’s translation.
7 US Department of Defense, News Transcript, Press Conference with Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld and NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson; Wednesday,
8 October 2003.
8 This concern may turn out to be the least important, however, because the integ-
ration of military forces not only weakens parliamentary control at the national
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level but at the same time creates new institutional constraints at the international
level (cf. also Dembinski et al. 2004). Just as a single state faces growing difficulties
to block the collective use of integrated forces (as Germany experienced with regard
to AWACS), it has become equally difficult for a single state to trigger the collective
use of integrated forces. Thus, states that have engaged in role specialization and the
integration of military forces may soon find themselves in a ‘joint decision trap’
(Scharpf 1988): they are no longer capable of deciding on the use of their military
individually because key capabilities (such as long-range airlift) have effectively been
‘communitarized’. At the same time, a joint decision on the use of force can only be
achieved after each member to an integrated structure has given its consent.
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